## 5 April 1963

|             | SUBJECT: DCI Morning Meeting   |  |  |
|-------------|--|--|--|
|             | 25X1C  |  |  |
| 5X1<br>5X1C | 2. Apparently the Lunik shot is going to pass close to the moon and not impact. It is not clear at this time whether it will orbit around the moon or be a miss. Mr. McCone indicated that there was high level concern about the U.S. manned lunar program and requested Mr. Kent to look at the estimate in light of the most recent shot. He also requeste GMAIC (later changed to OSI) to present information on what could be accomplished by instrumentation on the meon and what could be accomplished by having an actual man there.  3. OCI referred to a cable from Galbraith relative to U.S. activities.  I informed the DCI that we had, the previous evening, sent |  |  |
|             | 4. DCI indicated that he would be seeing Mr. McCloy next Tuesday. McCloy has been asked to review our disarmament policies and, particularly, the status of our test ban negotiations. DCI indicated that he had given his personal views to the President that our present position want too far in terms of safeguards and that he felt an agreement would not be particularly useful relative to the nth country problem since the Soviet have no control over China and  President was inclined to agree but felt that we should continue to negotiate, although he wasn't very sanguine about any success.  |  |  |
|             | McCloy has been asked to review our disarmament policies a larly, the status of our test ban negotiations. DCI indicated given his personal views to the President that our present potoo far in terms of safeguards and that he felt an agreement to particularly useful relative to the nth country problem sin have no control over China and  President was inclined to agree but felt that we should contin   | nd, particu- that he had sition want would not ce the Soviet The |  |
|             | McCloy has been asked to review our disarmament policies a larly, the status of our test ban negotiations. DCI indicated given his personal views to the President that our present portoo far in terms of safeguards and that he felt an agreement be particularly useful relative to the nth country problem sin have no control over China and President was inclined to agree but felt that we should continuegotiate, although he wasn't very sanguine about any success.   | nd, particu- that he had sition want would not ce the Soviet The |  |

25X6

|   | and the second of the second o |
|---|--|
|   | Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP66R00546R000100100201-1   |
|   |  |
|   | 25X1A  |
|   |  |
|   |  |
|   | 5. There is considerable concern about the subversive threat to Thailand. Apparently different reporters give different versions of the  |
|   | seriousness of the situation. DD/I has already prepared a briefing   |
|   | paper for the Director on the subject, but they were asked to look at it again in the light of any possible new information. This should be kept   |
|   | is mind as background in the event of  |
|   |  |
|   | 6. DCI reported on Special Group and deferment of Laos flight consideration until next week (see HS Memo for the Record). DCI  |
|   | directed that we prepare a flight plan for Laos and review with Harrin:  |
|   | prior to the meeting. Action: OSA  |
|   |  |
|   | 7. General Carter raised the question relative to  |
|   |  |
|   | He indicated this presented serious security problems.   |
|   | DCI wished to review the directive.  |
|   |  |
|   |  |
|   | 8. I reported on the successful CORONA catch; the OXCART progr   |
|   |  |
| , | 8. I reported on the successful CORONA catch; the OXCART program and on the NRO funding program. The DCI indic   |
|   | 8. I reported on the successful CORONA catch; the OXCART program and on the NRO funding program. The DCI indicates that McNamara had a directive from the President to prepare a conting   |
|   | 8. I reported on the successful CORONA catch; the OXCART program and on the NRC funding program. The DCI indicated that McNamara had a directive from the President to prepare a conting plan in the event that U-3s could no longer operate over Cuba. I stated that NRO had been given action on this and we were preparing a report.  |
|   | 8. I reported on the successful CORONA catch; the OXCART program and on the NRC funding program. The DCI indicated that McNamara had a directive from the President to prepare a conting plan in the event that U-2s could no longer operate over Cuba. I stated that NRO had been given action on this and we were preparing a report.  9. The DCI also briefed the President on the OXCART program.  |
|   | 8. I reported on the successful CORONA catch; the OXCART programdon the NRO funding program. The DCI indicated that McNamara had a directive from the President to prepare a conting plan in the event that U-3s could no longer operate over Cuba. I stated that NRO had been given action on this and we were preparing a report.  9. The DCI also briefed the President on the OXCART program. The President is very much interested in the supersonic transport, which   |
|   | 8. I reported on the successful CORONA catch; the OXCART program and on the NRC funding program. The DCI indicated that McNamara had a directive from the President to prepare a conting plan in the event that U-3s could no longer operate over Cuba. I stated that NRO had been given action on this and we were preparing a report.  9. The DCI also briefed the President on the OXCART program. The President is very much interested in the supersonic transport, while was discussed with Kelly by the DCI on his visit. Kelly had indicated   |
|   | 8. I reported on the successful CORONA catch; the OXCART programdon and on the NRO funding program. The DCI indicated that McNamara had a directive from the President to prepare a conting plan in the event that U-3s could no lenger operate over Cuba. I stated that NRO had been given action on this and we were preparing a report.  9. The DCI also briefed the President on the OXCART program. The President is very much interested in the supersonic transport, which  |

HERBERT SCOVILLE, Jr.
Deputy Director
(Research)

DDR:MScoville:mh

Distribution:

#1 - DDR Subject via ADD/R and EA/DDR

than just the aircraft costs in a SST program.

#2 - AD/OEL

## - AD/08A

#4 - SA/DDR

#5 - DDR Chappedved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP66R00546R000100100201-1